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SUMMARY India-China relations witnessed a new wave of optimism for 
a progressive and engaging partnership following the Wuhan Summit, 
the informal 2018 meeting between Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping. 
Key to this has been continuous exchange of political and official visits 
from both sides. However, these exchanges might not be sufficient 
to remove uncertainty and suspicion from their relations. As long 
as China’s relationship with the United States remains adversarial, 
China will embrace India—without guaranteeing that it will not 
adopt a confrontational posture in the future. Their shifting relations, 
though suggesting an official longing for an upward trajectory, are based 
on a compromised context. External circumstances have pushed them 
to rapprochement, but could also drive them apart. Whether India 
and China will sustain this rapprochement is difficult to foresee. 
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With the rapid emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a 
geopolitical paradigm, the trajectory of politics in 
Asia is changing. North Korea is taking incremental 
steps to reconcile with South Korea, the United 
States and China and to achieve peace in the Korean 
peninsula,1 albeit perhaps conditionally. Relations 
between two paramount economies—the U.S. and 
China—are becoming thornier, embroiled as they 
are in a sour trade conflict that is heavily influencing 
global trade politics. The dynamic between India 
and China seems to have changed as well, since late 
2017. As both are strengthening their economic 
and diplomatic ties following the military border 
standoff at Doklam in 2017—when India placed 
troops to prevent China from building a road into 
territory claimed by its ally, Bhutan—New Delhi 
and Beijing are trying out different forms of diplo-
macy to determine their spheres of influence while 
taking their relationship forward. Whether they are 
in cooperation, conflict, or bare coexistence has 
transcended bilateral relations, mainly because it 
now hinges on certain external conditions. This has, 
invariably, made India-China relations quite contex-
tual—foreign policy behavior is determined more 
by the regional and international context than by 
domestic factors. 
No matter how stable and secure India-China 
relations appear to be post-Doklam, the contextual 
nature of this stability is more or less “glocal”—their 
bilateral dynamics with the United States, Japan, and 
Pakistan, and with other smaller neighboring coun-
tries, will continue to be important. The 2017–2018 
revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, often 
known as the Quad 2.0, by the new liberal world 
nexus of Australia, India, Japan, and United States, 
has raised questions about the seeming stability of 
India-China relations. The Quad as an “Indo-Pacific” 
proposition is essentially a consequence of the 
growing power asymmetry in Asia, and is directed 
toward achieving equilibrium. By attempting to 
overcome the trust deficit between countries and by 
endorsing a multipolar world order, the Quad calls 
for a renewed commitment to an orderly rule-based 
global structure. 
Whether they are 
in cooperation, 
conflict, or bare 
coexistence now 
hinges on certain 
external conditions 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has 
received both jeers and cheers. India’s refusal to sup-
port the initiative has not drastically worsened their 
relationship, but has certainly caused qualms. So has 
China’s ever-increasing adventurism in maritime 
Asia, with the increase in the construction of ports 
and other maritime infrastructure in the Indian 
Ocean Region (IOR). 
These intense “glocal” conditions appear to be 
enduring, and continue to raise the question of 
whether the bonhomie and stability of India-China 
relations, noticed in 2018 and now to 2019, fol-
lowing the Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping informal and 
personal meeting in Wuhan, is a long standing one. 
How far this amount to a ‘compromised context’ in 
India-China relations? In other words, will the 
2018-19 stability of India-China relations endure, 
especially with Narendra Modi’s return to power 
in India?
The Political Overture to Reframe Ties
India-China relations are primarily a reflection of 
their foreign policy trajectories and domestic devel-
opments. Chinese foreign policy is geared toward 
reestablishing China at the center of the global eco-
nomic and political system, and India, like other 
major powers, faces the dilemma of accepting or 
resisting it.2 It is important to tackle the zones of 
contestation, given that energy and maritime secu-
rity are at risk owing to the growing turmoil in West 
Asia. Given the current geopolitical landscape, which 
might be heading toward greater polarization, India 
is most likely to benefit by not explicitly aligning 
with either China or the United States.3 India needs 
the Quadrilateral consultative forum as much as it 
needs a peaceful border with China. For China, too, 
a stable neighborhood is crucial as it navigates its 
relationship with an openly adversarial United States 
under President Donald Trump. Both countries 
therefore have a tactical opening for improving their 
relations, but within limitations. The Wuhan spirit 
provided temporary solace but was perhaps not 
entirely successful in overcoming the points of 
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contention in their asymmetrical relationship. 
The Doklam border stand-off was no ordinary 
episode in India-China relations—with its potential 
to escalate into a small-scale war, it tested their dip-
lomatic nerve and skills. Diplomacy was at its core 
and both sides successfully averted further escalation. 
India stood proud that the Indian Army successfully 
faced the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for 73 
days, something that few Asian militaries perhaps 
could do. For New Delhi, it was crucial to stop the 
PLA from constructing roads in the Doklam tri-
junction area, in what it terms a disputed region, 
without triggering a war. For Beijing, its attempt to 
inject an element of strategic complexity into a 
politically stable India-Bhutan relationship was suc-
cessful, as evidenced by China’s ongoing attempts to 
create divisions between India and its neighbors. 
Moreover, Beijing sought to test India’s diplomatic 
character and military preparedness in the face of a 
territorial threat. The resolution of this incident thus 
illuminated the complexity of India-China relations 
and how small-scale incidents can spiral without 
political will. 
However, the inference that the possibility of an 
India-China confrontation is remote is not guaran-
teed. China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping exhibits 
long-term territorial ambitions, both land and mari-
time. With Donald Trump acting on impulse with 
regard to China and being generally erratic, the 
other leaderships were compelled to readjust their 
treatises. Hence, the renewed attempt to reframe 
India-China relations, by means of several official 
exchanges in 2018 and 2019, have certainly brought 
temporary stability to the relationship. 
To maintain “closer strategic communication” 
was the overarching outcome of the Modi-Xi in-
formal meeting in Wuhan. The Modi-Xi meet on the 
sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) in Qingdao in June 2018 [and now in 
Bishkek in June 2019] was followed by a meeting 
against the backdrop of the Johannesburg Brazil-
Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) summit 
in July 2018. This strengthened the notion that 
India-China relations were fast following a 
personality-centric engagement process. The 
Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe’s visit to India 
in August 2018 was more for rebuilding the lost con-
fidence between the two militaries. Establishment of 
a hotline between their militaries and resumption of 
annual military exercises and dialogues set the course 
for reframing the faltering relationship, generating an 
amount of confidence that was most required. 
Added to this was the positive change evidenced 
in their bilateral trade exchanges—the most stabi-
lizing factor in their relations – witnessing an 
upward trend of 25 percent, to almost $90 billion 
in 2017–2018. To India’s concern, the trade ties 
with China are lopsided, with Beijing enjoying a 
growing trade surplus. Not to overlook, after the 
United States, India has the second-largest trade 
imbalance with China. All initiatives to improve 
this situation have only increased Chinese dumping 
in Indian markets. 
Contrary to India’s advocacy for a ‘multipolar 
Asia,’ a unipolar Asia led by China seems to be the 
Chinese leadership’s overarching ambition. However, 
in Chinese estimation, under the ambit of a multi-
polar Asia, cooperation with India will remain a 
priority. Beijing is continuously pitching at such a 
scenario. For instance, the recently concluded second 
Belt and Road Forum summit in April 2019 points 
to a scenario in which China would like to exhibit a 
more flexible and accommodating posture to the out-
side world, including its important Asian neighbors. 
As India is amassing power, capitalizing on its stra-
tegic interests to better position itself globally as an 
emerging power, it forms an indispensable portion 
of the Chinese stratagem of global engagement. 
Furthermore, India’s participation is crucial for the 
successful establishment of an Asia-centric model 
of global governance, be it through the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), or an 
expanded SCO and the BRICS. Such externalities 
have prepared the ground for India-China coopera-
tion, but it is contextualized by the geopolitical situa-
tions in which both are intertwined. On India’s part, 
a spirit of competitiveness is readily discernible, to 
check the increasing Chinese adventurism in South 
As India is amassing 
power, it forms 
an indispensable 
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Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) without 
appearing too provocative to China. Beijing, too, 
anticipates a strong Indian role in the U.S.-led liberal 
world order, and therefore, maintain caution, and 
does not want the relationship to turn adversarial. 
An Offshoot Of U.S.-China Friction
Both India and China have always, independently, 
tried to have a stable and mutually beneficial rela-
tionship with the United States. China’s primary 
quest currently lies in stabilizing the trade and eco-
nomic relationship; India’s interest is to quickly con-
vince Washington of its emergence as a leading 
power, secure high-end technologies, and strengthen 
the defense partnership. With the United States con-
sidering India as an important strategic partner in 
the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the Indian navy is 
increasingly exhibiting tendencies to cooperate with 
the U.S. Naval Central Command (USNAVCENT) 
in terms of force-projection capabilities.4 Both coun-
tries are negotiating to enable India to play a more 
active role in counter-piracy operations, anti-subma-
rine warfare, and carrier-based and other combined 
naval operations in the Combined Maritime Forces. 
Such operations, along with the Malabar exercises, 
military maneuvers undertaken by the Quad coun-
tries in parallel with their strategic dialogue, are part 
of a two-pronged strategy—first, they help expand 
India’s naval capabilities to give it a stronger regional 
presence and, second, they make China wary of this 
India-U.S. collaboration and encourage it to be 
more cautious in the maritime domain. 
On the other hand, the trade war between 
China and the United States, which began with 
Washington reprimanding China for unfair trade 
practices, escalated when China adopted a retaliatory 
approach. Since July 2018, the United States has 
imposed duties on $250 billion worth of Chinese 
goods and China has retaliated by imposing tariffs 
on U.S. products worth $110 billion.5 Although a 
temporary truce was achieved after the Group of 
Twenty (G-20) Summit in Buenos Aires on 
December 1, 2018,6 it turned out to be ineffective. 
The United States and China have been unable to 
arrive at a solution, inflicting damage on both econo-
mies.7 In this scenario, China is looking for other 
potential markets and India, owing to its proximity 
and huge market, is an ideal partner.
This trade war has given other countries an 
opportunity to reevaluate their trade networks and 
enforce pending free trade agreements (FTAs). China 
and India too, by participating in tariff relaxations, 
are in favor of making their economic relations more 
robust and diversified. However, three questions 
emerge in the overall context of their bilateral rela-
tions—first, how can Indian imports from China be 
diversified without increasing the trade imbalance; 
second, which sectors should be targeted if exports to 
China are to be increased while avoiding Chinese 
retaliatory trade measures; and third, what are the 
platforms for diversifying production in India to 
shrink the “Made in China” label. 
While India’s challenges are to transform its 
market for foreign investors, liberalize its tariffs, and 
boost its FTAs, the challenge for China lies in 
shifting its global trade away from the United States. 
Although the growth rate of India-China trade experi-
ences momentary surges, various stresses remain, 
such as the huge trade deficit India is incurring. 
While U.S.-China trade tension does not have any 
direct repercussions on the Indian market, it 
increases the risk of China diverting excessive goods. 
Undoubtedly, China will suffer a huge loss if it loses 
its grip on the Indian market. Reducing trade tariffs 
on products like rice and amending the Double 
Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) are crucial. 
To address the increasingly uneven trade relation-
ship, China has reportedly agreed to import two mil-
lion tons of sugar.8 However, the problem is that the 
Chinese sugar industry is also facing oversupply.9 So, 
India’s trade volume may not end up making much 
difference to their trade statistics. Addressing this 
trade deficit will, for the time being, keep India-
China relations bristling. 
China is looking 
for other potential 
markets, and 
India is an ideal 
partner 
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As can be observed, China is rising but is also 
encountering bumps—it may perhaps even be forced 
onto a collision course with the United States. In this 
context, taking a step back and rethinking some of 
its strategic and diplomatic engagements might be 
beneficial. This requires China to find like-minded 
partners to contribute to establishing an alternate 
global governance structure.10 Time and again, China 
has declared its intention to get India on its side in 
an attempt to revise the world order. In 2018, the 
Chinese ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui said 
“From the global perspective, in recent years, the 
developing countries represented by China and 
India have emerged as a group, contributing to the 
ongoing ‘rise of the East’ in the transforming world.” 
He further noted that “As neighboring major 
emerging countries, we should coordinate our posi-
tions and also explore ways to be with each other.”11 
What perhaps gives more meaning to such state-
ments are accompanying actions, and China’s recent 
decision to lift its technical hold on declaring 
Masood Azhar, chief of the Pakistan-based militant 
group Jaish-e-Mohammed, a terrorist at the United 
Nations is a clear diplomatic triumph for India. 
Notwithstanding the pressure that was building on 
China for protecting an internationally ill-famed ter-
rorist and the continuous effort put in by India at 
major international discussions, the call has finally 
resolved a serious contention. 
A Compromised Deal Across the Indian Ocean
An understanding of how developments in the 
Indian Ocean are putting India and China at logger-
heads is important not just to ensure national and 
maritime security, but also to sustain their geopo-
litical interests. The growing power asymmetry, mili-
tary projection and perception in the maritime 
domain have driven their relationship into an 
intensely competitive zone. The perception of threat 
has left both powers scrambling for legitimacy. For 
India, China seeks to reinforce its offshore defense 
capabilities by entering into military and semi-military 
alliances with partner countries, building ports, 
posting noncombat troops, and supplying arms to 
selected partners.12 Indeed, the Chinese presence is 
most strongly felt in the Djibouti naval base in the 
Horn of Africa, on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, 
and in the Gwadar Port of Pakistan. China is 
upgrading another deep sea port in Myanmar’s port 
of Kyaukpyu. There is speculation that this is leading 
to another Hambantota-like situation, strengthening 
China’s foothold in the IOR. 
In the case of Pakistan, as well, China is actively 
engaged in massive sales of military equipment. This 
strategy of providing military assistance to the littoral 
countries is not well-received by India, which has a 
rather proprietary stance toward the IOR. New 
Delhi is enhancing its maritime connectivity net-
works based on “Security and Growth for All in the 
Region” (SAGAR). While the stress is on a safe, 
secure, stable, and shared maritime space,13 chal-
lenging Chinese growth and building durable 
capacity is the principal concern. One advantage 
that India has in the IOR is that China has not yet 
declared a coherent Indian Ocean security strategy, 
although it is highly interested in acquiring ports, for 
instance the Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar 
in Pakistan, Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Payra and 
Chittagong in Bangladesh, Dolareh in Djibouti, and 
a few others on the African continent. Moreover, the 
BRI can now be considered as the de-facto Chinese 
grand strategy to inscribe its footprint across oceans 
and continents. Such beguiling multimodal connec-
tivity spans the IOR as well. 
Consequently, overseeing the presence of other 
countries’ maritime forces in the IOR is of utmost 
importance to India. China’s growing maritime 
understanding with Pakistan and India’s other neigh-
bors most strongly triggers much suspicion. This 
stems from three factors—China’s support to 
Pakistan, the Maritime Silk Road coupled with the 
Silk Road Economic Belt strategy, and the fact that 
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, i.e. land-
based Chinese military presence, will have conse-
quences for China-Pakistan military strategy. 
China is rising 
but is also 
encountering 
bumps 
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Therefore, India is also seeking to extend its outreach 
over the Pacific. Naval cooperation with like-minded 
countries like Japan, France, and the United States 
is at the forefront of India’s maritime strategy.14 
Earlier in 2018, India also succeeded in convincing 
Indonesia to collaborate in setting up a naval port 
in Sabang, strategically located at the entrance of the 
Malacca Strait. 2019 has also brought India a flurry 
of bilateral naval exercises with the United States, the 
Philippines, Japan, and Australia in the South China 
Sea and the Indian Ocean.15 This spirit of conducting 
vigorous maritime activities with like-minded coun-
tries has reinstated a sense of solidarity against rapid 
Chinese developments. 
India has realized that, on its own, it has limited 
resource capacity to match China’s assertiveness, 
making its outreach beyond the Pacific extremely 
important. With an increasing focus on developing a 
strong strategic deterrence against China, the Indian 
leadership is seeking to have an extended maritime 
neighborhood power-projection, with an emphasis 
on Act East Policy. Currently, India cannot rival the 
extravagant Chinese investment packages, but it does 
redeem itself by offering something China does 
not—mutually favorable deals that are based more 
on partnership than on exploitative lending, such as 
the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and 
the Kaladan Multimodal Project. However, the 
problem for India in effectively challenging China 
lies in its decision-making process—India might not 
lack ambition but it certainly lacks the cohesiveness 
and the resolve to outcompete a country like China. 
Domestic Compulsions and the Growing Bond 
with Japan
Both Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping have long-
standing geopolitical ambitions to maintain stable 
relations, despite their various blind spots. For Modi, 
the 2019 national election is momentous for all the 
initiatives undertaken during his tenure, although 
India’s foreign policy—under the United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) or the National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA)—has followed the same principle of main-
taining good ties with major powers. For Xi Jinping, 
too, another standoff like the Doklam would give a 
strongly negative impression of China to the interna-
tional community. The current geopolitical situation, 
wherein the United States is inching militarily closer 
to India and moving out of China’s radius, is per-
turbing for the Chinese leadership. It has also 
become imperative that China not put the BRI 
under any stress. It is already facing a backlash from 
the Maldives, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka, as well as its 
“all-weather” friend, Pakistan. 
This puts Japan at the external core of India-
China relations. In 2018, India and Japan elevated 
their partnership, both economically and strategi-
cally, and had China fearing that they might become 
an existential counterweight. While Beijing and 
Tokyo did not make any effort to reinvigorate rela-
tions until very recently, New Delhi has always 
found a reliable strategic partner in Tokyo. However, 
India-Japan ties are unduly economically oriented. 
India’s need for Japanese investment for fast-track 
infrastructure development makes this relationship 
lopsided. Moreover, Japan’s intent to forge a stronger 
strategic bond with India is heavily influenced by 
two conjoined goals: (a) to protect its own security 
and commercial interests for which India is a pro-
spective partner; and (b) to facilitate the influence 
operations of the United States to balance out 
Chinese strategic outreach. Indeed, if anything, it is 
rapid Chinese commercial and military adventurism 
that has affected Japanese interests lately. So, a part-
nership with India is a natural progression, as both 
perceive China as assertive and expansionist. 
The dilemma facing both countries in this regard 
lies in reassuring China, which is deeply skeptical of 
any alliance in Asia, that their partnership is not a 
threat or a design to “contain” China. A direct diplo-
matic engagement for countering China could there-
fore prove tricky. Tokyo is now also a ‘conditional’ 
partner in the BRI. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe’s balancing act between India and China may 
have its pitfalls, but it is crucial for Japan to persist 
In an attempt to 
match China’s 
increasing footprint, 
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seeking to extend its 
outreach over the 
Pacific 
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in partnering with India, as much as with China. 
Stronger economic ties with China are of strategic 
significance to Japanese economic growth. 
Nevertheless, India-Japan ties have succeeded in 
generating a climate of strategic confidence across 
the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China. Yet, neither is a 
grand alliance against China inevitable nor could the 
Indo-Pacific liberal world nexus—primarily orches-
trated by the U.S.-Japan security alliance—afford to 
exclude Chinese presence. If anything, the point of 
the India-Japan understanding is to encourage 
Beijing to rethink its approach to Asian neighbors 
by creating a subtle pressure. To some extent, India-
Japan relations have succeeded in generating this 
positive climate against China, by also incorporating 
the voices of other prominent actors, including 
Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and other 
Southeast Asian countries. Together, these countries 
are balancing, if not completely preventing, the 
emergence of a highly Sino-centric vision of a 
world order.16
This is an opportune moment for India to move 
beyond the perceived asymmetries and focus on 
overcoming a hegemonic China by strengthening 
relations with like-minded states. Despite Trump’s 
cold approach towards India, New Delhi should not 
delay expanding its sphere of influence when Modi 
takes charge as the Prime Minister of India for a 
second consecutive term, especially when the United 
States is by and large in its side. India’s foreign policy 
under Modi 2.0 could become much more decisive 
and forceful. What makes China uneasy is precisely 
the increased attention India has recently garnered 
under the leadership of Modi. While it has never 
considered India as a major threat or competitor, it is 
still obliged to advocate better trade and investment 
cooperation and to see India as a multilateral eco-
nomic partner. Geopolitical compulsions in India-
China relations are likely to persist in the remainder 









Looking Ahead: Constrains to Cooperation
Three factors might constrain India-China relations 
despite bilateral efforts. First, the Indian and Chinese 
foreign policy ambitions have contradictory outreach 
programs. Either in the IOR or with ASEAN, secu-
rity ambitions for securing resource opportunities 
are bound to clash. For India, China is seeing it as 
a “limited Asian power,”17 and for China, India is 
acting as a proprietor of the Indian Ocean. Second, 
creating sustainable economic opportunities to 
uphold a true “development partnership” is another 
area of tension. India’s strong reservations about the 
BRI proposition could bring their future engagement 
to a standstill. It is also possible that they might 
make a fresh start on engaging and carrying forward 
their “development partnership,” including most of 
the BRI components, without India changing its 
principal position on BRI. Third, Beijing’s growing 
assertiveness in the maritime domain will not be 
well-received by India. In other words, despite the 
lack of maritime disputes between the two countries, 
the contest between them for maritime domain may 
gradually increase. 
Above all, differences in perception and mutual 
mistrust may persist between the two, as exemplified 
by India’s staunch refusal to endorse the BRI. 
Besides, there is no likelihood of continuation of the 
same externalities—a change in President Trump’s 
policies could have a dramatic impact on Asia’s 
regional dynamics. In such a scenario, India-China 
ties are not likely to improve drastically, and the 
cooperative trend seen in 2018 may be overridden. 
With Modi and Xi at the helm, as India and China 
prepare to have a second Wuhan-type summit later 
in 2019, the onus lies on finding a mutually satisfac-
tory balance. In the face of China continuing to 
cajole Indian policymakers to alter their resistance to 
BRI yet failing to understand India’s standpoint, the 
options are limited. Hedging and engaging in 
external balancing with the Quad countries, as well 
as promoting regional connectivity with ASEAN 
countries, therefore must be prioritized in India’s 
Indo-Pacific outreach. 
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